The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board oj Education' was less a promise than an opportunity. By withdrawing Constitutional approval of segregated schools, the Court did not guarantee racially integrated schools. Rather, the judicial acknowledgment of the social and psychological harm done black children under the never-realized "separate but equal standard," provided black Americans with an opportunity to seek a non-coerced, nonracial foundation on which to structure public school policies. Because the Court denounced official segregation, it followed-or at the time seemed to follow-that the Brown decision sanctioned desegregation as the remedy to which black children were entitled.
Resistance to school desegregation was so great and some of the methods of evasion so insidiously deceptive that civil rights proponents and, later, courts were forced to measure compliance with desegregation court orders by the extent to which the school system actually interspersed black and white children in the same schools.
2 Somewhere in the struggle to overcome the fierce resistance to desegregation, 3 civil rights lawyers and others, and particularly the courts, began to equate the elimination of the dual school system with the attainment of equal educational opportunity.
Your letter reflects the justifiable fear that these two aims are not the same. Former NAACP General Counsel, now Federal District Judge Robert L. Carter wrote: " [F] ew in the country, black or white, understood in 1954 that racial segregation was merely a symptom, not the disease; that the real sickness is that our society in all of its manifestations is geared to the maintenance of white superiority. 4 Thus, the dilemma you face in Delta County does not result, as some legal scholars would suggest, from analytical inadequacies in the Brown opinion" or from the Court's unfortunate failure to require immediate compliance with its mandate. 6 Full implementation of Brown remains an uncertain future prospect because of the continuing resistance of many whites who fear that the realization of "equal educational opportunities" for blacks will mean the loss of economic and status benefits that they and their children now enjoy solely on the basis of race.
The essence of the advice contained in this response is that white resistance in Delta County, and elsewhere, may be neutralized by utilizing the right to school desegregation as a valtable lever with which to achieve communitydesignated educational goals otherwise unavailable to an economically and politically powerless minority. But this leverage should be applied in ways other than, or in addition to, the enrollment of black children in predominantly white schools.
Conditions in Delta County require discussion of the following points: the legal and educational inappropriateness of placing total reliance on immediate integration of the Delta County schools; the considerations involved in accepting the school board's settlement offer; and a reexamination of what the Brown decision has meant to blacks, including suggestions on how to restore its waning vigor.,
TOTAL RELIANCE ON IMMEDIATE INTEGRATION
School desegregation statistics show that the Brown decision has done much of what it was intended to do-eliminate the dual school system based on race-and in precisely that area of the country where the Court intended its mandate to have effect-the South.' But the impact of Brown has been weakened, and its very existence as legal precedent endangered by the effort to apply its holding rigorously and inflexibly in large urban areas of the country, North and South, where public schools today are more racially seg-regated than they were in 1954,8 and where the barriers to desegregation, for all practical purposes, are virtually insurmountable.
In Delta County, geographic conditions compounded by comnmnity resistance have generated school desegregation problems quite similar to those found in large urban areas of both North and South. This is highly unusual in rural areas where, as the Supreme Court has noted, consolidated school systems implemented by bus transportation have enabled school adjustmerits "more readily than [in] metropolitan areas with dense and shifting population, numerous schools, congested and complex traffic patterns."
' That the rights of black children Under the Brown decision must encompass more than the entitlement to attend desegregated schools is evidenced by the suggestion in several recent Supreme Court decisions that there are limits to the extent to which school desegregation need be carried out. "No fixed or even substantially fixed guidelines can be established as to how far a court can go, but it must be recognized that there are limits."" Even after the demise of the "all deliberate speed" standard as justification for delay,i" a plan will not necessarily be enforced under any and all circumstances. i12 For at least the following reasons, it is doubtful that the courts will require implementation of a pairing plan in Delta Count\, before South Bridge is restored: 13 a. Busing is a limited remedy because the majority of white parents do not perceive it as a means of obtaining a better education for their children than 8.
STAFF OF SENATF SELECT COMM. S. 19, 20 (1969 ). 12. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744, 745 (1974 , despite the fact that the oinly effective desegregation plan was a metropolitan area plan, the Court held that desegiegation stops at the city limits, unless it call be shown that deliberately segregative actions %%ere taken in the surrounding school districts contributing to the segregation of the city's schuool system or that distiict lines were deliberately drawn oni the basis of' race. But see Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson Counts, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (consolidated with Haycraft v. Board of Educ. of Louisville). Similarly in Swaim, the Court indicates that even if busing were the only tool which could produce effective desegregation in a particular school district, it need not be utilized "when the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge oi the educational process." 402 U.S. at 30-31.
ON EQUAL
13. Milliken v. Bradley. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) , eliminated the possibility of federal courts ordering the consolidation of the hypothetical Delta Count schools w\ith those in neighbor ing counties for purposes of desegregation in the absence of proof that -the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in alt adjacent district, or sshere district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race.' 418 U.S. at 745. Milliken was followed b\ the Sixth Circuit which reversed a metropolitan desegregation order would be possible otherwise. Where school desegregation is not an issue, the school bus has become an accepted and generally welcome component of American public education. 4 But federal courts, aware of the resistance to busing over long distances as a means of effecting an end to segregated schools, have, in effect, legitimized this resistance "when the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process.
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Chief Justice Burger has indicated that he personally would stay a school desegregation order involving average daily travel times of three hours.1 6 Other members of the Supreme Court have indicated that busing, and integration in general, must be balanced against its disruptive effects on public education and "the rights and interests of children affected by a desegregation program .... ,17 And although unlike the Delta County situation, Swann involved busing across noncontigtnous geographic school attendance zones, the majority of the Court suggested that had there been "no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils nearest their homes."s Lower courts have rejected plans as not "feasible" where pupils would have been required to travel up to 2 1/2 hours a day, t 9 where the location 322 (N. Mills ed. 1973) . In 1972 HEWN estimated that '43.5% of the total public school enrollment or 18,975,939 pupils are transported to school daily." Id. at 324. "The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports that the total cost. including capital outlay lor pupil transportation for 1971-72 is $1.7 billion." Id. Of the 256,000 buses that travel 2.2 billion miles, id., only a small percentage were bused to achieve school desegregation.
Judge Winter. dissenting in Thompson v. School Bd., 498 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1973) , charged that the district court had relied on expert testimony which measured the effect of busing on childcren's physical and mental health on "whether he is happy, which, in turn, depends upon whether le is transported to a school 'of his choice or his parents' choice.' " Id. at 198. 18. Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. 402 U.S. at 28. Even so, the plan subseciently approved by the district cotirt in Charlotte required the transportation of 46,667 students. 334 F. Supp. 623. 626-27 (W.D.N.C. 1971) .
15.
However, apropos the Delta County situation, the Fourth Circuit has rejected a desegregation plan %%,hich retained racially identifiable schools because it did not encompass transfer of students across a river which divided the city. ledley v. School Bd. of City of Danville, 482 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973 ). celt. denied, 418 U.S. 1172 (1974 ; Gaines v. Dougherty County Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1972 ). 19. Thompson v. School Bd., 498 F.2d 195, 196-97 & n. 1 (4th Cir. 1971 . It should be of highways and railroad yards posed serious obstacles to the required transportation, 20 and where the age of students to be bused "lengthy" distances would have a "probable adverse effect upon the physical health and mental processes of the children. 2 1 Applying the above standards to Delta County, the court's 1972 pairing plan requiring the use of bus transportation was clearly appropriate when ordered. 22 With the destruction of South Bridge and no more feasible means than North Bridge available for crossing Barrier River, implementation would require bus rides of three to four hours-substantially greater than those in other plans which courts have refused to approve. b. Violent opposition to school desegregation does not constitute a valid basis noted, however, that this finding of infeasibility was based almost entirely on the testimony of a pediatrician, Dr. Hogge, who testified as an expert witness on behalf of defendants and whose testimony was confined to the effect on school children in grades kindergarten through two. The issue relating to grades three through seven was disposed of on entirely different grounds. Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973 ), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974 .
In Northcross the court had three plans from which to choose. Plans one and three would assure 100 per cent desegregation, but 80 per cent of those bused would ride 31 to 45 minutes each way while 20 per cent (mostly elementary school students) would ride 46 to 60 minutes each way. Plan two would only accomplish 83 per cent desegregation, but 100 per cent of those bused would ride 31 to 45 minutes each way. The court was influenced-perhaps decisively -by the "practical considerations set forth in Suann'" as outlined by the district court. 489 F.2d at 17.
In both Mapp and Goss the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the district court which approved plans requiring no busing: Mapp, because of the disruptive effect on the educational program that busing would have and the substantial amounts of capital outlay it ,%ould entail; Goss, because a unitary system alieady existed and the busing was proposed in order to improve the racial mix; both, because endemic geographic concentrations of blacks were responsible for the racial patterns of the school population.
In Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 377 F. Supp. 1123 (M.D Ala. 1974 ), aff'd per curiam, 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1975 , the Fifth Circuit approved (two-to-one) a plan in which 55 per cent of the black elementary school pupils were enrolled at schools 87 per (cent or more black, and nearly 40 per cent of the junior high school students are enrolled in schools 80 per cent or more black. District Judge Frank Johnson rejected plaintiffs' plan for greater desegregation. He found it was designed "for the sole purpose of attaining a strict racial balance for noncompliance or delay.
2 4 But where, as in Delta County, violent opposition has rendered implementation very difficult, there appears to be little by way of judicial precedent to justify a desegregation order which would exceed the Swann standards for busing, if done in retaliation against the violent acts which made the excessive busing necessary. Violent interference with school desegregation orders violates the federal criminal code; 25 it may also justify civil relief. 26 But future remedies provide little comfort to parents understandably concerned about the immediate danger of having their children transported over long stretches of country roads in a community where fanatics are willing-in order to prevent busing-to destroy bridges with evident impunity. Civil rights policies that limit the scope of Brown to rights obtainable only on pain of daily fear of physical harm should no longer be accepted without question by black parents in Delta County, or anywhere else.
c. New school construction in a location near North Bridge is an expensive alternative to reconstructing South Bridge-which the school board will not undertake voluntarily and which, because of the great cost involved, courts are not likely to require. School boards have been ordered to select "the construction sites of future schools so that desegregation will be enhanced."
The purchase of new buses to enable the transportation of school children has also been required, 28 even in a school system which had never before operated a transportation system and which did not promote a dual system by using buses. The violent measures resorted to in the fictitious Delta County situation appear extreme; however, there are recent reports of law enforcement officials in Boston indicating that an alleged terrorist campaign has been initiated by a group of anti-busing activists who reportedly plotted to destroy five to seven bridges which provide access to South Boston where the bluecollar white community has mounted a continuing protest against school desegregation ordered by federal courts. Boston Evening Globe, Dec. 20, 1974 Dec. 20, , at 34. 25. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1970 3 ' d. The emergency plan adopted by the Delta County School Board after the destruction of South Bridge will likely be approved by appellate courts even though the effect of assigning each child to the closest school perpetuates the dual school system. The Supreme Court has suggested that "the effect -not the purpose or motivation of a school board's action" is the crucial determinant in weighing the validity of a school desegregation plan, 3 2 and, by its decision in Green v. Connt y School Board," 3 implicitly endorsed the statement that " [t] he only school desegregation plan that meets constitutional standards is one that works.
' 3 4 But, as I've just indicated, no other, more effective desegregation plan can meet the Court's tests of "reasonableness" and "feasibility .
' 3
The addition of a "freedom-of-choice" provision to the emergency plan might be sought in order to accommodate parents wishing to voluntarily transport their children to Davis School.
3 6 The school board might even be required to provide buses for these students.
3 7 Regardless of whether this relief is obtained, the relatively small number of black children who chose Davis School under the pre-1972 plan suggests that no more are likely to do so now that the distances to be traveled are so much greater and the enthusiasm for integration in the black community is greatly diminished.
e. The private school, Causasian Children's Choice (CCC), by offering a segregated sanctuary to white families wishing to avoid integrated schools, poses
31.
A court might require construction of temporary classrooms at a midway point betweien the two schools for special integrated classes which all students might attend on a rotating basis perhaps once each week.
32. .A plan that is "reasonable. feasible and workable" is within "the scope of [equitable] reedial power," although in defining "the limits on remedial power of courts.... [s]ubstance. not semantics, must govern .... '" 402 U.S. at 24 n.8. 31.
In Gieen v. Cout
School Boaid. the Court struck clown the freedim -of-choice plan under which the school district had operated. but in doing so, it did not condemn freedomof-choice plans per se.
Where a "freedom of choice" plan offers real promise of achieving a Unitary, nontracial system there might be t) objection to allowing it to prove itself in operation, but where there are reasonably available other ways, such as zoning, promising speedier and more effective conversion to a tinitary school system, "'freedom of choice" is not acceptable. 391 U.S. at 439-41.
37. Swoon indicates. that, in order to be approsed, a nmajority-to-minority "'tansfer arrangenment must grant the transferring student free transportation and spatce: must 1 ie made available in the school to which he desires to move." 402 U.S. at 26-27. C/. Northt ioss v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 489 F.2cd 18 (6th (it. 1973) (approving orders reCIqit ing the city to provide funds and necessary gasoline needed for coutit-ordeted busing).
a serious obstacle to the elimination of the dual school system in Delta County, and thus is an appropriate target for legal challenge. CCC's discriminatory admissions policy is barely concealed by the ingenuous device of limiting admission to the children of residents who attended or were eligible to attend Davis School at a time prior to 1954 when it was segregated by law.
38
Private schools, which, as "segregation academies" to which white antiintegrationists escape, making school desegregation efforts futile, are barred from receiving any state aid in the form of tuition grants, 3 9 tax exemptions, 4 t books and other school supplies, 41 school buildings, either by purchase 42 or lease, 43 and even the exclusive use of publicly-owned facilities.
44
In addition, there is some judicial authority indicating that a post-Civil War federal civil rights law 4 5 may requiire admission of black children even to a wholly private school, when their rejection is based solely on race. 4 6 In order to challenge CCC's policy which now offers shelter for whites who don't wish to send their children to school with blacks, some Delta County black parents may be willing to apply for their children to be admitted. However, litigation to achieve this result is likely to be prolonged, as it affects the whole range of exemptions from civil rights laws that private clubs presently enjoy. Moreover, litigation intended to send black children to a school like CCC would be difficult to justify on educational grounds. And it could backfire as a tactic with which to undermine private schools: CCC officials might admit the few black children who applied, both as a defense against integration litigation and as a means of obtaining tax-exempt status and other governmental benefits from which they are now excluded. Rather than risk unintentionally assisting CCC-by having black children apply and thereby test the school's admission policies-it may be tactically wiser, given the limited nature of resources in the black community, to focus efforts on improving Bledsoe School. Without government support or the morale boost of defending against a desegregation suit, CCC may well fail on its own, as do large numbers of private, segregated academies and schools each year. The low income status of the parents who must finance CCC makes failure a good possibility. Indications that Bledsoe is functioning effectively could increase that possibility to a virtual certainty.
II THE SETTLEMENT OFFER
Assuming the Delta County School Board's emergency plan is upheld until South Bridge is replaced, the immediate question for the black community is whether the Brown precedent offers alternative relief for the educationally unsatisfactory conditions in all-black Bledsoe School. An assessment of the availability and value of such relief is necessary in order to determine the relative merit of the settlement plan offered by the board.
If black parents in Delta County share the educational priorities of blacks in other sections of the country, they are less concerned that Bledsoe School remains all-black than that its academic record is poor and that the community it serves is unable to influence basic decisions concerning personnel, curriculum, and teaching philosophy. These are the concerns that have motivated efforts by black parents to improve their children's public schools across the country in recent times, as well as for 150 years before the Brown decision.
4 " reoriented rather than overruled by Brown. 5 t The evil of "separate but equal" is less that its promise of equality was never achieved than that, as Judge J. Skelly Wright has observed: "the doctrine itself, imposed by a white society, unconstitutionally stigmatizes Negroes in that society." 52 The demand in Brown that school "segregation" be replaced by "integration" may "merely be semantic if the underlying reality of black powerlessness does not change. '' 5 If Brown was intended to renew the nation's languished commitment to blacks made when the fourteenth amendment was adopted, then the separate-butequal standard may serve as a point of departure in measuring the validity of school policies, particularly in those situations where integration is not feasible. Justice Douglas implies as much in a case where several factors contributed to the racial isolation of a predominantly black high school. 54 Even if the causes of racial isolation in the schools did not constitute segregation for which the school board could be held responsible under Brown, Justice Douglas felt that the problem was not resolved unless the school facilities provided for blacks and whites were equal as required by the Plessy doctrine.
a
In other contexts, some courts have recognized that minority-group children are entitled not only to a desegregated education, but to a school program that is tailored to their educational needs. For example, an educational program tailoire0 to the middle class child from an English-speaking family 55. 404 U.S. at 1240-41. The Pless -v doctrine, according to justice Douglas, might require a plan Under which white as well as black students are required to use the inferior high school unless inequalities in the hlack school were removed through upgrading. Id. But see Cumming v. Richmond (ounty Bd. of' EduIC., 175 U.S. 528 (1899), where the court lejected black petitioners' contention that the "separate hut equal" standard required the closing of a white high school until a black high school closed by the school board was reopened. Id. at 544.
Lower courts during the Ples.s era were no more willing than the Supreme Court to degrade the qualitx of' white schools in order to improve black schools, particularly when the board claimed financial problems limited its ability to equalize school facilities. See Leflar & Davis, Segegation in the Public Schools-1953 , 67 HARV. L. Rtv. 377, 395-96 & n.67 (1954 .
But it was the "separate but equal" standard that led to desegregation of graduate schools in several pre-Bowm cases, where the aliernative, according to the Court, could never be made "equal." Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) has been held to deny an equal educational opportunity to children from Spanish-speaking homes.
5 6 Rejecting school board contentions that the failtire to provide bilingual-bicultural programs did not constitute raciallymotivated discrimination barred by the fourteenth amendment, the district court, noting the low achievement levels in predominantly Mexican-American schools, ordered the school board to reassess and enlarge its program directed to the specialized needs of its Spanish-speaking students.
5 7 The Supreme Court, moreover, has reflected a similar view regarding a school system's failure to provide English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who speak no English.
5 8 A unanimous Court held that the refusal to provide language instruction denied the Chinese children a meaningful opportunity to participate in the public educational program in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the HEW regulations.
5 9 It would seem only a short step to extend judicial recognition of the special educational needs of Mexican and Chinese children who do not speak English to that of black children whose preschool contact with standard English may be so minimal as to also constitute an educational barrier. Rsv. 863 (1974) . The Supreme Court's refusal (by five-to-foui vote) to require equalization of school funding forlmulas in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) , does not seriously impair the abilit' of black children to require educational facilities to respond to their special needs. The concept of equalizing school funding formulas is not inherently defective, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584. 487 P.2d 1241 . 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971 , but such contentions may be better raised in litigation designed to show that unequal school funding, whether intadistuict or interdistrict, adversely affects the school's ability to respond effectively to its obligation to remedy the effects of past discrimination. cover equalization of physical plant, teacher quality, and curriculum. But real equality and educational effectiveness demand that public schools be responsive and responsible to those they serve.
Courts must recognize that groups long denied participation in school policy-making, and ill-equipped to monitor their children's educational progress, must have at least the judicial support and protection that have made current levels of desegregation possible. Perhaps paradoxically, separate schools which, through the implementation of alternative remedies, first become (in the educational sense) quality schools, may stand a better chance of eventually becoming integrated schools as well. At least one district court has recognized the necessity and possible value of alternative remedies.
6 2 Approving a school board's authority to both establish and later disestablish a community control experiment, the court indicated that a school system could experiment "to see how the effectiveness of the educational structure may be improved." And therefore, it could "not be prevented from ending one experiment and trying others, if the action is taken in good faith, without discriminatory intent or result."f 3 b. School board representation is an important element of an equal educational opportunity. Understandably, the Delta County board's settlement plan did not include representation of the black community on its five-person school board. Furthermore, since members are elected on an "at-large" basis, it will be quite difficult for the black community to elect a representative who will assert their special interests and needs."
4 But the argument can be made that Brown requires such representation or, at least, bars election processes which serve as discriminatory harriers to fair representation. The Supreme Court has required that electoral districts be apportioned so as to equalize the value of each citizen's Vote. 65 The principles of equal representation have also been applied to elected school trustees. 6 The Court has long recognized that at-large districts operate "to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population, and has warned that a multi-member district would be found unconstitutional as invidiously discriminatory if it could be shown that it operated "designedly or otherwise .. .under the circumstances of a particular case . . . to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population."
68
Multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties in Texas have been voided on a record that included proof of: a long history of official racial discrimination in Texas, particularly in voting; specific provisions of Texas primaries that disadvantage minority candidates; the total domination of the Democratic Party in selecting candidates for the legislature from Dallas County; the fact that only two blacks have been selected by the party and elected to the legislature since reconstruction days; and the fact that the party did not need black votes to win, and consequently did not "exhibit goodfaith concern for the political and other needs and aspirations of the black community.69
In Delta County no blacks have ever been elected to the school board, and the board's long-term refusal to comply with Brown reflects an antipathy to black concerns that justifies a legal challenge to the present election system, either under the pending school desegregation litigation or in a separate suit. 1969) . Black plaintiffs sought only a few weeks before a school board election and without an evidentiary hearing, to enjoin the at-large election of a fire-person Boston School Committee. The court, in denying plaintiffs' motion, held that a school system is not constitutionally compelled to adopt a district system in order to better the minority group's chances of securing representation of their particular interests. Id. at 1330.
Black voters have had more success in striking down discriminatory electoral schemes in the South where the long history of racial segregation and discrimination ease the difficulty of meeting the heavy burden of showing that the scheme was intended to discriminate against black voters. Compare Whitcomb v. Chavis. 403 U.S. 124 (1971), with White v. Regester 412 U. S. 755 (1973) .
Even if the at-large systein is struck down, election officials may attempt to gerrmander the single memher districts so as to make black voters a minority in each such district. See 5 HARV. Civ. RicGHtiS---Civ. LIB. L. REv. 472 (1970) .
In districts where school boards are appointed, the principles interpreting Brown to require desegregation of school faculities, Rogers v. Paul, 382 U. S. 198 (1965) Black people niust not resign theniselves to the pessimistic view that a nonintegrated school cannot provide Black children with an excellent educational setting. Instead, Black people, while working to implement Brown, should recognize that integration alone does not provide a quality education, and that much of the substance of quality education can le provided to Black children in the interim.
In at least two cases-Atlanta and Forth Worth-district courts have approved plans that gave black parents a larger measure of control over school policy-making in exchange for less integration than would otherwise have been ordered. In Atlanta, school litigation was protracted more than a decade through innumerable court orders and several appeals. 76 A group of plaintiffs, discouraged by the prospect of achieving meaningful desegregation in a district which was becoming increasingly all-black, 77 worked out *a compromise plan with the Atlanta School Board calling for full faculty and staff desegregation and limited pupil desegregation.
8
In exchange, the board promised to hire a number of blacks in administrative positions, including a black superintendent of schools. In approving the plan, the court was undoubtedly influenced by petitions favoring its adoption signed by " 
Mays, Comment:
Atlant-aLiving With Brown Twventy Years Later, 3 BLACK 1.J. 184, 191-92 (1974) . On the surface. this view departs more in emphasis than principle froni NAACP policy. A staff member of that group reports "The 1969 NAACP Annual Convention gave its blessing t) the concept of community control with the caveat that it must aid in advancing desegregation and quality education while fulfilling its basic ain of providing parents with a greater voice in running their schools." Watson, The Dettoit School Challenge. 81 THF CRISIS 188, 189 (June-July 1974). But on closer inspection, it becones apparent that the NAACP caveat swallows up the concept. Black children may or may not get a better education if they are bused to the suburbs, but it is highly unlikely that their parents will have more than a token input into policy decisions at the "receiving schools. Ga. 1973) . The district court found that the plan, w,,hich provided that no school Would contain less than 30 per cent blacks (or less than 20 per cent in already integrated "stablized" schools) xxas reasonable "considering the small percentage of' white children (21%) now r remlaining in the systeri . I... Id. at 1251 & n.7. 79. The court pointed out that it "could not on its own order anx hiring or firing except on the basis of merit. . . . Only by settlement could specific jobs be designated as 'black' or 'white,' even for initial appointment." 362 F. Supp. at 1251 n.6. C. Pttorcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), approving the Newark, New lersey, school board's decision to appoint blacks as principals over soine white applicants oi the pronotion list in order to better integrate administrative staffs and upgrade the pulblic schools.
80. 362 F. Supp. at 1251 ri 5.
tiffs disagreed, termed the compromise a "sell out,"8 and appealed. The appeal was burdened by a number of procedural issues concerning the lack of notice and the refusal of the district court to grant hearings on the compromise plan. This enabled the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to remand the case to the district court without deciding the merits of the settlement agreemen t.2
In Fort Worth, Texas, a district court approved continuance of a predominantly black high school and middle school located in a black neighborhood on a finding that black parents wanted to maintain a community school in which "the self concept of the blacks would be enhanced by giving them an opportunity to show their pride in their race and what they could do if given an opportunity.'"" In approving the plan which-in addition to the regular school program-would also provide educational and vocational programs for adults, the court found nothing unconstitutional about the concept where it comes at the plaintiffs' request. As did the court in Atlanta, this court cited no cases to support its conclusions, stating only that "it is beyond [our] comprehension to presume that the blacks are being denied equal rights with other races when they know what their rights are and they are getting something they requested."" 23, 1973) . The cout's statements in this unpublished opinion that Dunbar High School and Duinbtl Middle School could be combined into the "Dunbar Complex." and that while "the schools will be desegregated," the "maketip Of the neighborhood . . . [is stich] that the attendance will he predominately black"-must be seen in the colext of the entire plan adopted Iy the courlt in that case which ef'fectively desegregated more than one hundred schools in the Fort worth s\'sten. One of' the attorneys for the plaintiff. Norman J. Chachkin, has stated that the case was ntot appealed by the plaintiffs in view of the success that the litigation had achieved with respect to the rest of' the school system. Statement niade at The Courts, Social Science, and School Desegregation Conference, Hilton Head Island, S.C., Atig. 20, 1974 and not an unwillingness to desegregate have caused racial isolation in its schools; (2) that a simple desegregation order will increase the already rapid rate of "white flight"; and, (3) that it is willing to merge with the predominantly white Jefferson County system, but only providing it could preserve the parental influence on policy-making and educational program that has enabled their elementary-level children in the lower grades to read on the national level. Forty percent of the pupils are from poverty-level families; 80 per cent of those families are black.
8 9
The Louisville system attributes its educational gains to an "innovative superintendent" and to a program of shared decision-making power under which each of the fifty schools has a separate board, composed of patrons and educators, which participates in staff and curriculum selection and financial allocation. The local boards, according to the Louisville brief, "have been viable and their decisions responsible."
90 Community hostility toward particular schools has been reduced. But a simple merger, it is feared, will result in subordination of the poverty-level interests of Louisville's pupils in favor of the predominantly middle class white interests of Jefferson County. Nevertheless, upon remand of the case by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit found the Louisville situation different from that in Milliken, concluding that the problem in Milliken was that the remedy "was broader than the constitutional violation" but that in this case "the situation presented is that of two districts in the same county of the state being equally guilty in failing to eliminate all vestiges of segregation .... ." Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit noted that the district court's order could include an interdistrict remedy. 9 2 However, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) has intervened with somewhat similar arguments in a number of school cases. 9 3 In Swann, for example, CORE argued that integration was not the only method of eliminating segregation in the system and that the establishment of two nondiscriminatory and nonracially exclusive unitary school districts to replace the former segregated system would be an appropriate means of implementing the edict of Brown. 4 Under the now-invalidated dual school system, CORE said, one white board of education maintained control over two school systems characterized by racial exclusivity and arbitrarily imposed without choice or consent in a manner that: (1) stigmatized blacks, (2) excluded them from any meaningful participation in policy-making, and (3) systematically denied them equal school resources.
9 5
Furthermore, CORE pointed out that school integration usually perpetuates the worst aspects of segregation, Therefore, it suggested that dual school-district lines be drawn to serve "communities of educational interest": Each student would be permitted to attend schools in either district; each district would elect its own school board and set its own school policy. Given these criteria, CORE argued, there is no constitutional requirement of racial dispersal in these unitary systems. 39 (Mar. 1972) . These writers recognize that large-scale busing and consolidation of school districts makes impossible one kind of organization that a democratic society may wish to choose for its schools: the kind of organization in which the schools are the expression of a geographically defined community of small scale and regulated in accordance with the democratically expressed views of that community. Id. at 47. But they ignore the legal and political problems of how minority communities are to obtain control over policy-making and budgetary processes. [t]he elimination of neighborhood schools necessarily interferes with the interest and participation by parents in the operation of the schools through parent-teachers" associations, interferes with activities of children out of school, and interferes with their privilege of association, and it deprives then of wvalk-in schools. In can even lower the quality of education.
But it is doubtful if even these opponents of busing to achieve desegregation would accept the CORE alternative of two, perhaps overlapping, school districts which, in all likelihood, would be distinguishable by race.
The CORE argument that racial dispersal may not be educationally sound or legally required is not without merit and might receive more serious judicial attention if the relief sought focused more on the legitimate interest of parental participation than on the politically threatening and constitu-98. 418 U. S. 717 (1974) . 99. Id. at 741-42. Also see Justice Powell's opinion (concurring in part and dissenting in part) in Keyes, expressing concern that large-scale or long distance transportation of students disrupts public education, and ignores the practical and educational benefits achieved when children attend community schools near home. 413 U.S. at 238-52. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) .
On the other hand, the Milliken Court's reaffirmation of the Swann standards as the means for remedying intradistrict, de jure segregation, 418 U.S. at 744-45, raises some question as to the legal fate of an Atlanta-type settlement. But the question of alternative remedies was not, unfortunately, before the Court in Milliken.
100. Judge Weick dissenting in Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 466 F.2d 890, 898 (6th Cir. 1972 ). Subsequently, the court (including Judge Weick) affirmed -in a per curtam opinion-approval of a plan for Memphis that left nineteen all-black or predominantly black schools, including some that were all-black at the inception of the litigation in 1960. It did not affect any all-white schools. Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 489 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1973 ), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974 .
101. The district court that approved the Atlanta compromise rejected CORE's motion to intervene on the ground "'that the relief sought by that group [CORE] would be unconstitutional, i.e.. it would recreate a dual school system." Calhoun v. Cook, 487 F.2d 680, 682 (1973) . However, it did consider the CORE views on an amicus basis. Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249, 1250 n. 2. On appeal the Fifth Circuit ruled the denial of CORE's intervention effort was improper at least partly because "further proceedings may have demonstrated that CORE would be entitled to some but not all of the relief it sought in a manner that would have kept its position from being patently unconstitutional." 487 F.2d at 683.
The Fifth Circuit has evolved a specific intervention procedure for use in school desegregation cases. It requires intervenors to set out in their petitions "the precise issues . . . [they] sought to present ....
The district court could then determine whether these matters had been previously raised and resolved and/or whether the issues . . . were currently known to the court and parties in the initial suit. . . . If the court felt that the new group had a significant claim which it could best represent, intervention would be allowed." Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1973). tionally questionable goal of racially identifiable school districts. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence available which indicates that many desegregation orders are destructive of precisely those elements which are essential to the effective functioning of the educational process 10 2 and that black schools can be educationally effective.1 0 3 Even without a more detailed doctrinal argument, courts grown weary of enforcing busing orders favored by increasingly few might be amenable to Justice Powell's exhortation that the goal sought and often overlooked "is the best possible educational opportunity for all children" and that "[c]ommunities deserve the freedom and the incentive to turn their attention and energies to this goal of quality education, free from protracted and debilitating battles over court-ordered student transportation."
Earlier, in his concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part opinion in Keyes, justice Powell had criticized the majority's requirement that, in order to establish "a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design," petitioners in a northern school desegregation case need only show "intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system."' 1 0 5 Instead, he argued for an affirmative equal-protection right to an integrated education wvherever public schools are segregated to a substantial degree and wherever school boards are substantially responsible.
1 0 6 Should such a standard be adopted, proof of school board obligation would be easier to show because Justice Powell's criteria would effectively abolish the de jure/ de facto distinction.
transportation solely for the sake of maximizing integration."
108 Assuming that he did not wish to create a basically empty right (he did recognize the difficulty of racially balancing the larger urban areas of the country), 0 Justice Powell's approach must be read to encompass acceptance of those school plans which recognize the residential realities and propose educationallyviable, judicially monitored alternatives by which the equal protection right created by pre-existent segregation may be approached even though the integration aspect of it may not immediately be achieved. The legal and educational value of alternative schemes has been recognized by Dr. Kenneth Clark, a committed school integrationist, who provided much of the social science data cited in the first Brown decision.
110
Reviewing the patterns of institutionalized residential segregation which characterize the nation's large metropolitan areas, Dr. Clark stated: 1 "'
Given the fact that public schools, so far, reflect the racial populations of cities, the goal of attaining high quality education through the democratic process of realistic and administratively feasible forms of desegregation appears to be, at least temporarily, abandoned and is being replaced by the need to concentrate on raising the quttality of education without regard to the present racial composition of a city's public schools. This edu;-cational imperative Mustl be met. for the present generation of students in the public schools of our cities is not expendable. If xxe continue to fr ustrate these students educationally, they %%,ill be, in fact, the ingredients of the "social dynamite" which threatens the stability of our cities, out economy, and the democratic form of government. It is conceivable, also, that a present emphasis on raising the quality of education for these children %%-ill eventually facilitate rather than block the continued struggle for a nonracial organization of the public schools in the United States.
Several commentators who have discussed the problem of alternative remedies to school integration have suggested arguments that might help close the gap between Justice Powell's affirmative equal protection right and the educationally sound, constitutionally cognizable and presently available remedy urged by Dr. Clark.' " The discussions properly focus on the basic elements of the Brown decision seen by one writer as "integration, uncoerced association, and racially equal educational outcomes. 1 1a But. the assumption in Brown that racial isolation causes racially different outcomes and that racial integration will 108. 413 U.S. at 240. 110. 347 U.S. 483. 494 n. 11. S11. K. CLARK, supra note 61, at 54. Significantly, Dr. Claik recognizes, albeit almost ieluctantly, the value of improving the reputation for cuality of -black schools" in order to "facilitate'" his goal of tiuly integiated schools in this counti-. See also text at notes 125-27 ijoa. Judicial approval of a community control plan, as an interim alternative to integration, does not raise the equal protection issues presented by efforts to make community control a constitutional right.t 7 School systems which wish to correct for racial imbalance even in the absence of a constitutional requirement to do so,'" 8 may also adopt community-approved, interim, alternative remedies.
Reviewing the integration alternatives available to Delta County's black community, the equalization of school facilities and, possibly, school board representation may be sought through litigation. But the school board has offered more than equalization of facilities: it has promised to permit the Bledsoe School parents to select their next principal and to provide that person with wide authority in personnel selection, curriculum, and teaching approach. The details of this offer must be carefully drafted; they would include funding guarantees, the principal selection process, the mechanism for ongoing parental involvement, a process for monitoring pupil performance and teacher responsiveness, and, of course, the question of minority representation on the school board. It is essential that all aspects of the plan be judicially approved and supervised.
Assuming the board would agree to all these conditions-as it might in order to avoid integration of Davis School when South Bridge is rebuiltthe question of the constitutional validity of a permanent settlement, as in Atlanta, would almost certainly be raised. Realization of the points set forth 114. For a summary of the findings of various studies, see Goodman, supra note 107. at 400-35 & no. 356-465. 115. Green -. Count\ School Bd., 391 U.S. 430. 439-42 (1968) . 116. Kirp, supta note 112. at 1369-70. 117. Kirp, supra note 1 12. at 1374-84. But even if' the remedial nature of the alternative to integration is ignored. here is ample basis for arguing that such abternatives meet even a strict scrutiny standard athbough they tend to give state sanction to racially identifiable schools.
See Alternative Schools for NIinoritv Students: The Constitution, the Civil Rights Act and the Berkeley Experiment, supra note 1 12.
Even Proponents concede that community control does not guarantee educational quality, and although it has been promising where tried, the experience is far ftrom problem-fi-ee.
Soe
NI. ZIstsT These arguments will have greater impact if the board can be convinced to incorporate a review period, of five to ten years, after which it would automatically return to the courts for further consideration of the integration remedy. In support of this arrangement, its advocates could argue that: while Brown requires school desegregation, the courts gave whites fifteen years of "all deliberate speed" to get ready for racially-mixed schools; 11 9 most of this time was squandered in evasive tactics that further damaged black children. Now that desegregation has been ordered, many black parents recognize the need for a period during which they can choose schools where the priority is overcoming the dual image that black children cannot learn and that black schools are poor schools. Even if no educational benefit to black children occurs during the period, the principals of Brown are not affected; social science evidence has failed to reveal any educational strategy that is certain to equalize educational outcomes. By limiting the settlement plan, blacks also explicitly preserve their all-important right to attend schools with whites.
III
THE Brown DECISION REVISITED Whether Delta County, or other blacks, should seek a settlement plan of the type described will depend on many factors which are unique to each individual community; but some general considerations should assist parents in reaching conclusions endemic to conditions in their area.
Although the Brown decision purported to give blacks the right to attend school with whites, it actually provides blacks with the means to achieve educational equality in black schools. 120 The power inherent in the right to school desegregation has been frequently worth more than the educational value of exercising that right. This apparent paradox conforms perfectly with a societal pattern in which minority rights are granted or /withheld by the majority according to which action will serve majority interests best. Blacks were the gratuitous beneficiaries when the northern states abolished slavery in the post-Revolutionary War period because slavery was not eco-119. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. at 301. 120. Certainly Brown comprised associational, as well as educational, components. But having judicially condoned the continued existence of "one-race" schools in a desegregated school system, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 25-27; Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 489 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1973 ), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974 , and seemingly having consigned substantial numbers of inner-city black students to permanent assignment in all-black schools, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) , it is too late to argue the imperative in Brown of having black children actually attend school with whites.
nomically feasible and provided unwanted competition with white labor. 1 2 1 Southern slavery was prohibited by issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation less because it was morally reprehensible, than because such action was compelled by the need to disrupt the Confederate work force and the desire to win European support. 122 It is possible that history will show that the Brown decision also served the interests of white Americans more than black Americans. 123 The multiple motivations that abolished slavery did not prevent blacks from obtaining their freedom; similarly, the progress made under Brown has been great, despite its ambivalent origins. But, further progress in the school area requires at least the basic recognition that there may be a distinction between what is offered and what can be obtained.
In accomplishing this cognitive process, some basic facts must be accepted: a. White opposition to school desegregation is increasing. This is hardly a secret.
12 4 Most whites have never been enthusiastic about sending their children to school with more than a few blacks. The Brown decision won sympathy for the plight of black children, but it did not alter the steadfast opposition of white parents to enroll their children in predominately black schools. For all the reasons that a racist society could muster, most black schools were inferior to their white counterparts. But, in the course of arguing the need to admit black children to white schools, integrationists painted a far worse picture of the situation than even some pre-Brown black schools and their products deserved.' 25 The appeals to white sympathy concerning the plight of black children gained support for desegregation in general, but increased the determination of white parents not to involve themselves and their children in what was presented as the only remedy.' 2 6 As one writer put In effect, the liberal community, both black and white, was caught up in a wrenching dilemma. The only way, it appeared, to move a sluggish nation towards massive amelioration of the Negro condition was to show how terrifyingly debilitating were the effects of discrimination and bigotry. The more lurid the detail, the more guilt it would evoke, and the more guilt, the more readiness to act. Yet the same lurid detail that did, in the event, prompt large-scale federal programs, also reinforced white convictions that Negroes were undesirable objects of interaction.
The social scientists did not help matters. In an effort to prove the educational value of desegregation, studies were published which seemed to show that black pupil performance improved when they were placed in white schools.1 2 8 The corollary to this interpretation was: " 'when you mix Negroes with Negroes, you get stupidity.' "129 Later studies were inconclusive, tending to show, according to Ronald Edmonds, Harvard's Urban Studies Center Director, that "under court-ordered integration, some Black pupils do better, some Black pupils do about the same and some Black pupils do worse."
13
Faced with such inconclusive data and, already concerned about the enforcibility of long-distance busing orders, all but the most committed federal judges paused and almost beseechingly looked for help. 13 1 b. Integration strategies remain inflexible despite the unimpressive reports of the educational effectiveness of integration, despite the increasing white opposition as school integration standards designed for southern rural areas are applied to large urban areas, and, most important of all, despite indications that black parents in large numbers have lost faith in the basic strategy of school desegregation litigation, i.e., to get the same quality of education white children are receiving, you must enroll black children in the same schools as white children.
The key to the disenchantment of black parents can be found in the desegregation orders themselves. In an effort to make school desegregation 
131.
In an unpublished order subsequent to Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974) , requiring the Boston School Committee to file a desegregation plan for 1975, Judge Garrity, after setting out detailed instructions for a plan that shall provide for the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation of all grades in all parts of the city, gave all parties and other interested community groups until Jan. 20, 1975 , to submit to the court alternative plans to all or any portion of the defendants' student desegregation plan.
As Professor Bickel has observed:
[C]ourts confronted with racial isolation in a school district that is doing precious little on its own to attack its [educational] problems will order busing because there is not much else that a court (an do that will have an impact. Bickel, Education in a Denocracy: The Legal and Practical Problenms of School Busing, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 59-60 (1973) . [Vol. 39: No. 2 as palatable for whites as possible, courts have permitted school boards to close black schools, often over the vigorous protests of the black communities they served, 1 3 2 and authorized "one-way" busing in which black children do most or all of the bus riding while whites continue to attend schools in their nieghborhoods.1 3 3
Black teachers and administrators, the largest black professional class, have been decimated by the desegregation process despite herculean efforts by civil rights attorneys to protect their jobs.' 3 4
Even the percentages of black students assigned to white schools are determined less by the percentage of black students in the school district than by the number of blacks white parents will tolerate before withdrawing their children. 135. Professor Thomas Pettigrew of Harvard has urged a racial mixture of 30 per cent black to 70 per cent white pupils so as to achieve a high correlation between race and socioeconomic class, thereby maximizing educational achievement. He also suggested that such a ratio would not precipitate middle class flight. Beckett v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 308 F. Supp. 1274 , 1290 -91 (E.D. Va. 1969 . The district court agreed and approved a plan with this balance in some schools, but because of the high percentage of blacks in the system, 76 per cent of the elementary students would remain in one-race schools. Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 434 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir. 1970) . Finding that the plan failed to establish a unitary school system, the Fourth Circuit revetrsed and remanded to the district court. 434 F.2d at 412.
In a subsequent school case in which the Pettigrew thesis was revived, Judge Sobeloff-in a separate concurring opinion-attacked it as -invidious.... a resurrection of the axiom of black inferiority, . . .and no less than a return to the spirit of Dred Scott." Brunson v. Board of Trustees of School Bd. No. 1, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) . Undeterred by the threat of white flight, Judge Sobeloff stated that school desegregation "is not founded upon the concept that white children are a precious resource which should be fairly apportioned .... [S] chool segregation is forbidden simply because its perpetuation is a living insult to the black children and immeasurably taints the education they receive." Id.
Regrettably, treating white flight (and white opposition generally) as legally irrelevant serves the cause of logical debate better than it does the realities of actually desegregating schools.
Sensitivity to the concern of white parents for the quality of the desegregated school is, of necessity, acute. It is no surprise then that school policies regarding the use of standardized achievement test scores for assignment to tracks or special classes, Tex. 1974) , for example, the superintendent of the Dallas school system conceded that the disproportionate number of black students who received suspensions was because "we are a White controlled institution, institutional racism. racism among individuals.-Id. at 1336. An expert witness for plaintiffs testified: "[i]nstitItional racism exists . .. w hen the standard operating procedures of an institution are prejudiced against, derogatory to, or unresponsive to the needs of a pairticular racial group." Id. The court accepted this testimony, but stated that -[n]o court can decree a change in attitude, and urged "everyone involved to accentuate the positive While at the same time eliminating the negative effects of 'white institutional racism.' " 376 F. Supp. at 1338. The court then directed the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) "to reviewi its present program and to put into effect an affirmative program aimed at materially lessening 'white institutional raisin' in tihe DISD." Id.
138. Kenneth Haskins. recalling his experience in an integrated school, said decisions were generally made to satisfy whites as though "the purpose of integration was to benefit the black children. and really the white commtunity was doing them a favor, by allowing this to happen. Professor Charles Hamilton describes an experience in which a white teacher of a desegregated class, comprised of middle class white thildren and lower-class blacks from a public housing Project. led a discussion Of Winter vacations, for which many of the White children would soon be departing. According to Professor Hamilton:
The disccission ft1on1 the white students was spirited and full of exciting accounts of flight plans, hotel reservations, Florida beahes and play areas. The black students sat silentlv. \Vhen a visiting hlack parent, who had observed the session. spoke to the teacher afterwxards, the teacher was quite elated over the lively discussion ad Cinthusiasm of the students. The paren, however, complained that that session was pre-participate in extracurricular activities 3 -or to terminate the use of a racially insulting school song or cheer, 140 it is not hard to imagine the level of the priority accorded their academic needs in all too many "integrated" classrooms.
This type of damage is precisely what Brown intended to eliminate in the coerced segregated setting. It is a measure of the virulence of racism that the problem still persists in some schools restructured to eliminate its effects; the failure to recognize it further decreases the chances that thousands of black students will experience any benefit from the Brown decision during their school years, while increasing the very real risk that continued rigid pressure solely for school integration will seriously erode the progress already made, not only in schools, but in other important areas of civil rights as well.
Professor Charles Hamilton several years ago warned that "[i]t is absolutely crucial to understand that the society cannot continue to write reports accurately describing the failure of the educational institutions vis-a-vis black people without ultimately taking into account the impact those truths will have on black Americans." 141 But the predominant litigation strategy today in school desegregation suits is to advocate "all out" integration and to categorically oppose predominantly black schools-a philosophy which "has brought us to the advent of metropolitan desegregation without sufficient regard having been given to the probable instructional consequences of such a move for those Black children most numerously affected."
1 42 This is attributable in part to the fact that those who generally handle school desegregation litigation do not always have the ongoing close community contact with members of the class they represent which is required to ensure continuing sensitivity to client interests. As a result, the emphasis has been cisely the kind of insensitive education to which she felt the black students should not be exposed. The teacher was puzzled and hurt; she saw or heard nothing wrong or offensive in the discussion at all. The parent explained that the black children were totally excluded because theii parents could not afford to take them on expensive vacations. Their sense of inferiorit) was reinforced, and they were made to feel that watching television and running the halls of the housing project during the week while their parents worked could not match the glamour and thrills of a week's vacation in the Florida stin. The teacher explained that she was unaware of the race of those students who did and did not participate. This episode, to the parent, was an example not of the admirable trait of color-blindness but of the insensitivity of the educational system to the needs of the black children, and it was further evidence of the dubious benefits of integration on both racial and class bases. on total desegregation, even when white flight is certain to void the victory of any meaning. Generally, no consideration is given to settlement, although such action might better serve the interests of the disadvantaged class. 1 
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For example, in the Boston School case 1 44 the court, having found the school committee responsible for blatant and overt racial discrimination, granted the only relief sought-racial balance-even though this required the busing of hundreds of poor black children to blue collar white areas where, if anything, the schools were educationally inferior to those from which the black students came. 145 The violent response of the white Bostonians was indefensible, but predictable, given their conviction that black students will deteriorate already inferior schools and their knowledge that the well-to-do suburbs are exempt from the problems they face.
146
It is difficult not to give wholehearted support to even the most unfortunate school desegregation order intended to obtain compliance with Brown. But in Boston and in many other school systems, poor white as well as black parents have been provided public schools that are far less than they should be. The black parents are able to translate the inadequacies of their schools into constitutional terms, for which remedies are available. To insist that courts can only remedy these constitutional violations by mixing black children with the most disadvantaged whites in poor schools reflects a poverty of innovation foreign to equity and is potentially disastrous to hopes for an integrated society.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Earl Warren, in trying to formulate a constitutional basis for the contention that segregated schools were legally invalid, wrote:
147
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the [fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson wsas written. We must consider public education in the 143. Bell, supra note 49, at 278. See also Justice Harlan's dissent in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 461-63 (1962). 144. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974) . 145. The two white high schools to which black students were assigned under the court order graduated a total of 865 students in the 1973 class. Only 173 (22 per cent) entered four year colleges. The two black high schools to which white students were assigned graduated 261 students during the same period, 74 of whom (28 per cent) entered four-year colleges.
The state average is 32 per cent, and the city's two "elite" high schools (admission by tests and grades) sent 97.7 per cent of their graduates on to four-year colleges. MASSACHUSETTS DE- (1973) .
PARTNIENT OF EDUCATION, DISTRIBUTION OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
Both white high schools are overcrowded. The black schools are underutilized. South Boston High (no black students in 1971-72) was overenrolled by 676 students. Girls High (now Roxbury High. with 91.7 per cent black enrollnent) was underenrolled by 532 places in the same year. [Vol. 39: No. 2 light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Similarly, black people cannot expect to find in the Brown precedent a full and complete answer to problems that twenty years ago either did not exist in their present form or were not recognizable without the hard-earned contemporary understanding that societal racism can disadvantage black children as effectively (although more subtly) in integrated as in segregated schools. With that knowledge and with the experience gained over the last two decades, effective arguments can be made in the courts and through the political process to gain those public school rights which the Brown decision categorized as an "equal educational Opportunity." In this effort, flexibility of approach is crucial. The principles of Plessy v. Ferguson as well as Brown v. Board of Education can be used effectively. No approach should be discarded, and few should be universally embraced. The guiding principle must be that black leadership in Delta County, as elsewhere, mtst listen carefully to what black parents want from schools for their children and then design strategies that utilize constitutional rights and political leverage to achieve these educational goals.
Sincerely, Derrick A. Bell, Jr.
